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LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN MULTISTATE 
PROBLEMS: AS BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAW 
Lea Brilmayer*t 
The Supreme Court's renewed interest in multistate problems is 
striking.1 After years of neglect, the Court in the last few terms has 
decided a series of cases on personal jurisdiction, 2 choice of law, 3 
and credit to judgments.4 Several of these opinions have been path-
breaking; at least one has revolutionized its field. 5 One of the most 
recent, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,6 is a choice-of-law decision 
destined to provoke much scholarly comment.7 
While the case was still pending, one commentator expressed 
hope that Hague would provide a "coherent" constitutional choice-
of-law test to replace the "confused theory of the past."8 Instead 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, 
University of California at Berkeley; LL.M. 1978, Columbia University. - Ed. 
t A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at The University of Pennsylvania Law 
School in November 1980. The author wishes to thank many colleagues who have contributed 
ideas and criticisms. The consistently fine research assistance of Brenda Lyons, Class of 1981, 
was supported through the generosity of the Illinois Bar Foundation. 
l. In addition to the cases recently decided, see notes 2-4 i,!fra, the Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear several cases with multistate implications in the 1981-1982 term. See Under-
writers Natl. Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., cert. 
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981) (No. 80-1496) (effect of decision of bankruptcy rehabilitation 
court when decisions affect rights of citizens of other states); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, cert. 
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981) (No. 80-848) (relationship between forum non conveniens dis-
missal and choice of law). 
2. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulka v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186 (1977). 
3. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 
(1979). 
4. See Thomas v. Was~gton Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
5. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For discussions of the impact of Shqffer, see 
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 33 (1978); Symposium on 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 493 (1979); Symposium: State-Court Judicial Jurisdic-
tion After Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 low AL. REv. 991 (1978); Symposium: The Impact of Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273. 
6. l 0 l S. Ct. 633 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
7. Even before the Supreme Court decided the case, one commentator had discussed the 
problems resulting from the lower court's opinion and urged reversal. Martin, Personal Juris-
diction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872, 886-88 (1980). See Lowenfeld & Silberman, 
Choice of Law and the Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate v. Hague, - U. CAL. 
D.L. REV. - (1981) (forthcoming). 
8. Martin, Sllpra note 7, at 888. 
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Hague has perpetuated, or possibly intensified, the confusion and 
uncertainty that have characterized constitutional choice-of-law the-
ory. Hague produced three opinions, none of which commanded 
majority support. Although the plurality and the dissent seemed at 
times to agree on general principles, those principles were sufficiently 
vague to support their opposite conclusions. The common ground 
was that constitutional limits depend in some way on state policy 
interests, and on the contacts between the dispute and the forum. 
This Article examines that common ground, analyzing the roles 
of state policy interests and contacts in defining constitutional lim-
its.9 It concentrates particularly on one paradoxical aspect of the in-
teraction between federal and state law. While the scope of 
constitutional limits on application of forum law is necessarily a fed-
eral issue, constitutional analysis simultaneously defers in some un-
specified way to state policy. This is because federal choice-of-law 
questions frequently tum on the existence of a state policy interest 
that legitimizes the application of state law.10 The resulting interde-
9. This Article discusses only the constitutional limits designed to prevent a state from 
"overreaching" its constitutionally permissible legislative jurisdiction. It does not address the 
problem of "underreaching" - the extent to which a state can choose not to apply its law. 
One of the critical issues in ''underreaching" cases is the extent to which states may decline 
to extend the protection of their laws to individuals from other states. The pertinent constitu-
tional provisions are the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection clause. See, 
e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). Several 
worthwhile articles discuss this problem. E.g., Simson, .Discrimination Against Nonresidents 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1979); Note, 
Unconstitutional .Discrimination in Choice of Law, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 272 (1977). See gener-
ally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980). 
One problem with residency distinctions that has not been discussed is that where there are 
no other multistate elements in the case, states ordinarily do not decline to apply their law 
merely because of residency. There is a peculiar double standard; although a state may claim 
in a conflicts case that the nonresidency of the protected party defeats an "interest," where all 
of the events occurred in the state, it does not even discuss the effect of that party's nonresident 
status. This assertion can be documented by comparing explicit choice-of-law decisions with 
diversity cases removed to federal court, where the defendant is by definition a nonresident. 
See, e.$·• Wargo v. Marston, 465 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1972); Davis v. Klaiber, 229 F.2d 883 
(6th Cir. 1956); Ortman v. Smith, 198 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952) 
(guest statute cases in which the defendant's nonresidency did not raise choice-of-law 
problems). 
There are, therefore, two problems with using residency distinctions besides the discrimina-
tion objection. First, why is it that courts do not routinely treat diversity cases as choice-of-law 
cases? See, e.g., Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976); 
Mascarenas v. Johnson, 280 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1960); Hess v. Bennett, 245 F.2d 807 (9th Cir, 
1957); Von Lackum v. Allan, 219 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1955); Peterson v. Denevan, 177 F.2d 411 
(8th Cir. 1949); Harlow v. Ryland, 172 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1949); Crowell v. M. R. & R. Truck-
ing Co., 157 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1946); Russell v. Turner, 148 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1945); Hansen 
v. Schott, 283 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ind. 1967) (guest statute cases in which the state would have 
had an "interest," but where there should at least have been some choice-of-law discussion). 
The second problem is deciding what additional traditional territorial factors must have 
been contacts with other states before nonresidency becomes significant. 
10. Virtually all modem choice-of-law cases frame the due process and full faith and credit 
issues in terms of state "interests." See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,424 (1979); Carroll 
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pendence of the federal and state issues would seemingly empower 
state legislatures and courts to foreclose constitutional claims 
through question-begging definitions of the reach of state policies. 
Only careful definition of the respective roles of state and federal law 
can prevent the federal issue from completely degenerating into state 
common law or statutory interpretation. 
The first step in defining their respective roles is to distinguish a 
state's ordinary domestic policies from the policies that it has formu-
lated to deal with multistate problems. Although the constitutional 
inquiry should take account of the former, it should disregard the 
latter. Otherwise, these multistate policies will reduce the constitu-
tional issue to a question of state law - what did the state legislature 
intend? By drafting permissive choice-of-law provisions or expan-
sively interpreting a statute's intended reach, states could control the 
constitutional outcome. 
The second step is to explain how domestic policies enter into the 
constitutional analysis. Although rather murky, the formulations of 
the Hague dissent and plurality offer some support for a test based 
upon state sovereignty. Under this test, a contact connecting the dis-
pute to the forum creates a legitimate interest in applying the forum 
rule only if there is a regulatory connection between the rule and the 
contact. The rule must, in other words, be designed to prescribe the 
legal consequences of the in-state occurrence. But even this formula-
tion endangers the federal issue. Whether a domestic regulatory 
connection exists depends on how courts construe the rule's underly-
ing policies - an issue of state law. This affords state courts an op-
portunity to disguise and legitimize their multistate preferences by 
discerning novel domestic regulatory connections. The solution of-
fered here is a requirement of proof that the regulatory justifications 
advanced for choice-of-law purposes also serve domestic functions. 
Throughout the Article, the vehicle for illustrating these arguments 
is Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. 
v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 
(1954); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska 
Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). All of the opinions in 
Al/stale Ins. Co. v. Hague spoke of "interests." See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 637-38 (contacts must 
create state interests); 101 S. Ct. at 643-44 (wife's residence and appointment as personal repre-
sentative in Minnesota demonstrates Minnesota interest); 101 S. Ct. at 645-46 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (discussing role of interests under the full faith and credit clause); 101 S. Ct. at 652 
(Powell, J., dissenting) ( citing B. CURRIE, The Conslilulion and the Choice of Law: Government 
Interest and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188 (1963) 
[entire volume hereinafter cited as B. CURRIE]). 
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF MULTISTATE POLICIES 
In.Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the plaintiff's husband, Ralph 
Hague, had died in a collision with an automobile while riding as a 
passenger on his son's motorcycle. Neither vehicle operator was in-
sured. The plaintiff brought suit in Minnesota on behalf of her hus-
band's estate, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist clause 
in his insurance contract. Although Wisconsin law apparently11 
would have limited recovery to $15,000,12 Minnesota permitted an 
insured to "stack" insurance. The estate would thus recover $45,000 
because the deceased's three automobiles each carried $15,000 in un-
insured motorist coverage. 
The defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, argued for applica-
tion of Wisconsin law. Several contacts supported its position: All-
state had delivered the insurance policy in Wisconsin, the accident 
had occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin 
residents at the time of the accident. The trial court nevertheless 
applied Minnesota law, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed,13 
and the United States Supreme Court affirmed in tum. 
The Hague plurality maintained that a "significant aggrega-
tion"14 of three contacts gave Minnesota a constitutionally sufficient 
interest in applying its stacking rule. First, the plaintiff had become 
a Minnesota resident after the accident, but before instituting the liti-
gation 15 - a factor that the plurality explained would be insufficient 
by itself.16 Allstate's continuous business presence in Minnesota 
11. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Wisconsin law was not clear on this issue. 
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 48 & n.8, 49 & n.9 (Minn. 1978), ajfd. ofter rehearing 
en bane, 289 N.W.2d 50 (1979), ajfd., 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). 
12. Wisconsin law honored "excess insurance" clauses that prohibit the stacking of insur-
ance policies. Although Justice Stevens's concurring opinion assumed that Hague's insurance 
policies did not prohibit stacking, the Minnesota court thought otherwise, and cast the issue as 
whether these provisions should be overridden. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 
43, 48 (Minn. 1978), ajfd. ofter rehearing en bane, 289 N.W.2d SO (1979), ajfd., 101 S. Ct. 633 
(1981). 
13. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), ajfd. ofter rehearing en bane, 
289 N.W.2d 50 (1979), q(fd., 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). 
14. 101 S. Ct. at 644. 
15. 101 S. Ct. at 643. 
16. 101 S. Ct. at 643 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 
(1936)). By stating that after-acquired domicile would not be sufficient, the plurality probably 
intended to remove the incentive to forum shop. The plurality also stressed that the change in 
residence was bona fide. 101 S. Ct. at 643 n.28. Even with these safeguards, however, there 
still exists a significant incentive to forum shop. First, where a party has other in-state contacts 
(as in Hague) the possibility that a change in residence may tip the balance could induce the 
party to move. Second, the state trial court generally will be disposed to find that the move 
was genuine and the Supreme Court may have a fairly limited power to review this finding of 
fact. Cf. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927) (Court limited its review of state court 
findings of fact to cases where a federal right had been denied as the result of a finding of fact 
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supplied a second contact. 17 But the plurality was apparently most 
impressed with the third contact - Ralph Hague's status as a Min-
nesota employee at the time of his death. 18 
Each of these contacts raises tantalizing constitutional issues. 
First, there are good reasons for reluctance to allow a plaintiff's af-
ter-acquired domicile to affect the choice of law. Permitting a party 
to choose a state's law by changing domicile harks back to pre-Erie 
Railroad19 days, when an enterprise could create diversity jurisdic-
tion and avail itself of the federal version of common law by dissolv-
ing and reincorporating in another state. 20 On the other hand, it can 
be argued that if a state deliberately denies the benefit of forum law 
to remove incentives to relocate, it may run afoul of the constitu-
tional "right to travel." Although Shapiro v. Thompson 21 is distin-
guishable,22 the "right to travel" that Shapiro recognized remains 
problematic in after-acquired domicile cases.23 
Allstate's continuous in-state presence and substantial volume of 
Minnesota business are equally problematic. It is not clear whether 
this apparently unrelated contact should be held to support the right 
to apply Minnesota law to this particular case.24 Contacts of this 
without evidence to support it, or where conclusions of law and fact were too closely inter-
twined). 
17. 101 S. Ct. at 642-43. 
18. 101 S. Ct. at 640. As a related and subsidiary aspect of this ''very important contact," 
the plurality pointed out that Hague co=uted daily to work in Minnesota. The fact that he 
was not killed while co=uting to work was considered unimportant 101 S. Ct at 641. 
19. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
20. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
21. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
22. First, the defendant in Hague was a private party; in Shapiro the defendant was a state 
that had denied public assistance. Second, in Hague, only the amount of recovery was at 
stake; in Shapiro, the question was whether the plaintiff could recover at all. Third, in Hague 
the claim was based on past events; in Shapiro the claim was based on present need. But cf. 
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (loss of social security benefits following move to Puerto 
Rico did not infringe on right to travel). 
23. First, the fact that the defendant was a private individual seems to have no relationship 
to the right to travel. Second, under Shapiro the state probably could not even limit welfare 
benefits to the first state's lower award. This would still be an attempt to discourage relocation 
to achieve higher benefits. Furthermore, Shapiro found objectionable the different treatment 
of new and old residents. 
Third, and most important, Hague relied upon the state's interest in providing recovery for 
needy plaintiffs. The Court explicitly analogized to state services, as did interest analyst theo-
rists. It is this analogy that makes the "right to travel" argument - which otherwise seems 
frivolous - colorable and bothersome. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legis-
lative Intent, 78 MICH. L. R.Ev. 392, 4ll n.68 (1980). 
24. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633, 653 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (''The 
forum State has no interest in regulating that conduct of the insurer unrelated to property, 
persons or contracts executed within the forum State."). 
The plurality suggested that because Allstate was doing business in Minnesota it would be 
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type give rise to general jurisdiction to adjudicate, 25 but the Court on 
several occasions has distinguished between adjudicative and legisla-
tive jurisdiction.26 Reliance upon this contact is tantamount to sug-
gesting that the state has plenary power to regulate conduct 
occurring anywhere, so long as the burdened party has the sort of 
continuous contacts that support general adjudicative jurisdiction. 
To do business in Minnesota, Allstate in effect would have to agree 
to application of Minnesota law in all of its out-of-state contractual 
activities. The case support for this proposition is at best ambigu-
ous. 27 
The constitutional doubts surrounding these two contacts make 
the plurality's emphasis on the third contact especially crucial. 
Ralph Hague's Minnesota employment is, in any event, the most in-
teresting contact for purposes of analyzing the concept of "legitimate 
familiar with Minnesota law. Since Allstate could expect to be sued in Minnesota, it should 
also anticipate that a Minnesota court would apply its own law. IOI S. Ct. at 642-43. As the 
dissent argued, this argument proves too much, since it would justify application of the law of 
any of the fifty states. See 101 S. Ct. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell pointed 
out, the plurality also failed in its attempt to make the doing business contact relevant by 
combining it with other contacts. Because the Court did not initially explain the constitutional 
relevance of doing unrelated business, it is not clear how this contact could add anything to the 
other contacts. 101 S. Ct. at 653. Furthermore, although Allstate might have expected that 
Minnesota would try to apply its law, it is circular to suggest that it was obliged for this reason 
to anticipate that the Supreme Court would allow Minnesota to apply its law. 
25. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. at 653 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
26. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. at 644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). See generally Martin, supra note 7. 
21. Compare Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (state may apply criminal law to 
resident engaged in prohibited activity outside Florida territorial waters), with Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) (dictum suggesting that Virginia might not punish its citizens 
for obtaining abortion in New York). Where the conduct did not occur in another slate, as in 
Skiriotes, the constitutional considerations are different because of the wording of the full faith 
and credit clause. See Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. 
Rev. 185 (1976). 
Federal regulatory statutes have also been given extraterritorial effect. See Blackmer v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (subpoena power over United States citizens extends to 
foreign countries); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (citizens co=itting acts in a 
foreign country directly injurious to the United States government are subject to punishment 
under § 35 of the Criminal Code); Bryant v. International Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 
472 (D.NJ. 1980) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extends to an American corpora-
tion's employment practices in a foreign country). 
The decision to give a federal statute extraterritorial effect has been approached as a matter 
of statutory interpretation. See Bryant v. International Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 
482 (D.N.J. 1980). Several cases dealing with the reach of various labor laws have taken this 
approach to preclude extraterritorial application of these statutes. See McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional, 372 U.S. IO (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957); 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 
1222 (1976); RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973). The federal right to regulate extrater-
ritorial conduct is stronger than the state's right to regulate activity in other states because it is 
not constrained by the full faith and credit clause. None of these cases, however, adequately 
analyzed Congress's power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in the first instance. 
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interests." The Hague plurality concluded that Minnesota employ-
ment contributed to Minnesota's legitimate interest in applying its 
stacking rule because Minnesota had police power responsibilities 
toward persons employed there. 28 Although the dissent also framed 
the problem in terms ofinterests,29 it suggested that employment was 
an inadequate contact because it was irrelevant to the legal issue. 30 
Neither opinion took advantage of the opportunity to formulate gen-
eral guidelines for determining whether contacts give rise to "legiti-
mate interests." This challenge posed by the third contact is central 
to any policy-based analysis. 
The only existing methodological formulation for evaluating 
state interests is demonstrably incomplete. Brainerd Currie, 31 the 
leading academic proponent of interest analysis, explained: "The 
method I advocate is the method of statutory construction. . . . It is 
explicitly an attempt to determine legislative purpose."32 This expla-
nation has the advantage of making the policies behind the compet-
ing rules relevant to the constitutional inquiry. Prior choice-of-law 
methods had merely characterized a problem as tort or contract, and 
then proceeded mechanically to apply the "place of wrong" or 
"place of making" rule. 33 But while superior in some respects to the 
primitive methods that most courts had been using, Curri~'s system 
has the unattractive side effect of reducing all constitutional choice-
of-law issues to questions of state statutory interpretation.34 
28. IOI S. Ct. at 640. 
29. IOI S. Ct. at 651-52. 
30. IOI S. Ct. at 654. 
31. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note IO. 
32. B. CURRIE, Conflicts, Crisis, and Confusion in New York, supra note IO, at 690, 727. 
33. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 337 (1934). 
34. See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 401. Currie of course realized that there were limits 
on what states might do through assertion of an "interest." At one point he suggested that the 
Supreme Court must ask whether the policy has a "demonstrable existence," or whether it is 
"too technical or attentuated to be of constitutional significance." B. CURRIE, supra note IO, at 
277. He never explained how to reconcile this with the principle of statutory construction, or 
with his vehement insistence that the Court should not "label one interest paramount and the 
other minimal" Id. 
His discussion of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), is equally confusing. B. 
CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, supra note IO, at 584, 625. He assumed that "essen-
tially, the inquiry is whether that court would construe the statute as applicable to a case of the 
Clay type." He then argued that if the state court stated on remand that it would do so, the 
Court should ask whether an essentially retroactive application was consistent with the due 
process and contracts clauses. This is quite astounding given his characteristic disparagement 
of predictability and vested rights arguments. See Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 399 n.34. 
Moreover, since the contracts clause and retroactivity prohibitions do not apply to judicial 
decision making, there would be no limitation whatsoever where the underlying rule was sup-
plied by co=on law. For a discussion of the different predictability constraints imposed on 
legislatures and courts, see Brilmayer, The Institutional and Empirical Bases of the Rights The-
sis, 11 GA. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1977). 
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The problem is most obvious when the state has an explicit statu-
tory choice-of-law rule, as in the early case of Alaska Packers Associ-
ation v. Industrial Accident Commission .35 In such circumstances, a 
definition of "interest" that turns upon statutory interpretation is sat-
isfied whenever the state choice-of-law provision purports to make 
the statute applicable. Even where the state has no explicit choice-
of-law provision, however, the identical problem arises: a state court 
could create interests by expansively interpreting a statute's intended 
territorial reach. From the federal perspective, an explicit state court 
interpretation should be as authoritative as an explicit statutory 
choice-of-law provision.36 In fact, when a state court construes state 
law, there is not even a jurisdictional basis for appeal to the Supreme 
Court.37 Thus in Hague, for instance, the statute could be defini-
tively "construed" as applicable whenever the deceased was em-
ployed in the state, with no basis for federal scrutiny. If "policy 
analysis" is taken literally and without qualification, it gives state 
legislatures and courts effective authority to decide that a constitu-
tionally sufficient interest exists. 
Adherence to the familiar distinction between state "internal" 
law and state ''whole" law obviates the problem.38 A state's internal 
law consists of its domestic rules and policies; whole law includes 
both internal law and the state's conflict-of-law policies. When de-
termining the existence of a legitimate interest, courts should con-
sider a state's internal domestic policies, but not its multistate choice-
of-law policies. 
Two analogous uses of the interest terminology give rise to strik-
ingly similar problems, and thus demonstrate the usefulness of this 
distinction. First, a number of personal jurisdiction cases have relied 
upon the concept of a state interest in providing a forum.39 In Shaf-
fer v. Heitner ,40 for example, the plaintiff argued that Delaware had 
35. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 
306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
36. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), for example, held that state decisional 
law was entitled to the same recognition as state statutory law. Even prior to Erie, however, 
federal courts followed state court interpretations of state statutes. 
37. For an important qualification, see Part II,§ C infra. 
38. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 68 (2d ed. 1975); R. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 67-71 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing 
renvoi). 
39. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). On the role of state interests in the law of personal jurisdiction, 
see generally Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 77; Carrington & Martin, 
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1967). 
40. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
June 1981) Legitimate Interests 1323 
a strong interest in entertaining shareholder derivative suits against 
managers of Delaware corporations. The court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that if such an interest had existed, Delaware would 
have expressed it in a specifically drawn jurisdictional statute ad-
dressing derivative suits against Delaware corporations: 
[The] argument is undercut by the failure of the Delaware Legislature 
to assert the state interest appellee finds so compelling. Delaware law 
bases jurisdiction, not on appellants' status as corp.orate fiduciaries, but 
rather on the presence of their property in the State.41 
If the Court's rationale was that explicit expression of a specific in-
terest would meet constitutional objections, then states could draft 
away their constitutional problems by making their jurisdictional 
statutes more specific.42 In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan un-
derstandably was troubled by letting the constitutional issues depend 
so directly on state law. He could not "understand how the existence 
of minimum contacts in a constitutional sense is at all affected by 
Delaware's failure statutorily to express an interest in controlling 
corporate fiduciaries."43 
Recognition-to-judgments cases present analogous problems. In 
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,44 decided last term, a plurality 
of the Court echoed Justice Brennan's Shaffer concerns and refused 
to make a state's multistate policies constitutionally dispositive. 
Thomas was a workmen's compensation case that reexamined the 
so-called ''Magnolia/ McCartin test."45 Under that test, one state's 
workmen's compensation award barred a subsequent award in an-
other state only if "unmistakable language" in the first state's statute 
precluded awards in other states. Prior case law indicated that the 
full faith and credit clause and its implementing statute compelled 
the test.46 But the plurality found it peculiar that the full faith and 
credit issues should tum upon the interpretation of state statutes. It 
observed that automatically deferring to the first state's statute "au-
thorizes a State, by drafting or construing its legislation . . . directly 
to determine the extraterritorial effect o~ its workmen's compensa-
41. 433 U.S. at 214. 
42. Several lower court cases have upheld jurisdiction under similar circumstances on the 
basis of a more specifically drafted statute. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Pomeranz, 423 A.2d 174 
(Del. 1980); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978), appeal dismissed, 296 
N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979). 
43. 433 U.S. at 226. 
44. 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
45. The Magnolia/McCartin test is derived from Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 
U.S. 430 (1943), and Industrial Commn. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
46. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976). 
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tion awards."47 The plurality flatly refused to permit states to dictate 
the constitutional outcome through careful drafting or interpretation 
of its statutes: "[The Magnolia/ McCartin test] represents an unwar-
ranted delegation to the States of this Court's responsibility for the 
final arbitration of full faith and credit questions."48 
In both personal jurisdiction and recognition-to-judgments cases, 
differentiation between domestic and multistate policies achieves the 
best of both worlds. Courts can defer to state domestic policy con-
cerns without allowing states the latitude to dispose of federal issues. 
Multistate preferences, such as a naked desire to provide a forum, 
should not support a determination that interests sufficient to uphold 
personal jurisdiction exist.49 Yet the due process limits indirectly re-
flect state domestic interests. The substantive rules that govern the 
litigation determine which contacts are specifically related to the dis-
pute, and contacts so related have greater justificatory force.so Simi-
larly, in credit-to-judgments cases, courts should defer to the 
rendering state's domestic res judicata policies.SI They should not, 
however, permit a state directly to dictate the preclusive effect of its 
judgments in other states.52 
47. 448 U.S. at 270. 
48. 448 U.S. at 271 (footnote omitted). 
49. q: Carrington & Martin,su_pra note 39, at 237 (presumption of validity does not attach 
to state jurisdictional policies). 
50. See Brilmayer, supra note 39. 
51. One casebook, for example, treats the issues raised by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) as a 
problem of federal incorporation of state res judicata law. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO 
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WESCHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
505 (2d ed. 1973). See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938). 
52. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. at 270: 
[B]y virtue of the full faith and credit obligations of the several States, a State is permitted 
to determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments; but it may only do so indirectly, by 
prescribing the effect of its judgments within the State. 
The McCarlin rule, however, focusing as it does on the extraterritorial intent of the 
rendering State, is fundamentally different. It authorizes a State, by drafting or constru-
ing its legislation in "unmistakable language," directly to determine the extraterritorial 
effect of its workmen's compensation awards. 
Justice Stevens was undoubtedly right in principle: a state should not have complete au-
thority to determine the res judicata effect of its judgments in other states. For instance, the 
second forum should not be bound to honor the first state's res judicata policies if the first 
state's policies explicitly give greater res judicata effect to its judgments when enforced in an-
other state. But Justice Stevens misapplied this principle to the facts of Thomas, because he 
disregarded a valid internal law policy - releasing the insurer from further liability of any 
kind. Justice Stevens declared that this interest was "not of controlling importance," 448 U.S. 
at 280, because the worker could have filed initially in the more generous state. 
This reasoning is completely unsatisfactory. In every full faith and credit case that seeks a 
second judgment, the plaintiff could have filed initially in the second state. If taken seriously, 
this argument would totally destroy all credit-to-judgments requirements - the second state 
would never be constitutionally obliged to honor the first state's more restrictive internal res 
judicata policies. Justice Stevens's argument is a blanket criticism of res judicata policies, 
whether domestic or multistate. A defendant should not lose his plea of res judicata if it ap-
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As Justice Brennan's Sh(!ffer and the Thomas plurality opinions 
indicate, it is not consonant with the purposes of constitutional adju-
dication to give constitutional weight to a state's multistate policies. 
Many values are constitutionally protected precisely because they 
are more important to the federal enterprise than to the states. States 
are likely to be insufficiently solicitous of or even hostile to such val-
ues. The "free trade" ideal embodied in the commerce clause is il-
lustrative. When enacting protectionist laws, a state considers only 
its own immediate gains and losses and may underestimate the resul-
tant harm to the federal system. For this reason, the Court does not 
defer to a state's protectionist policies,53 but considers only conced-
edly legitimate goals, such as safety and health. 
As in commerce clause cases, constitutional limits regarding 
credit to judgments, jurisdiction, and choice of law exist because 
states are likely to be insufficiently sensitive to the needs of the fed-
eral system. It would thus be inconsistent with these limitations to 
give states effective authority to decide their scope. Peculiarly multi-
state policies are suspect in ways that domestic policies are not, for 
the political safeguards accompanying adoption of domestic rules 
are absent.54 A state presumably formulates its internal law after 
pears that, had the plaintiff handled the case more competently, the result would have been 
different. In the adversary system, parties are bound by their mistakes, including presumably a 
foolish choice of forum. Furthermore, Justice Stevens's reasoning would allow a plaintiff de-
liberately to file first in a state with lenient substantive rules and then in a state with restrictive 
substantive rules but higher monetary awards, without jeopardizing his initial recovery. 
Although constitutionally irrelevant, extraterritorial intent may be given effect regarding a 
question of state law: does the state intend to exercise less than its constitutional share of 
power? Perhaps the Mccartin rule can be justified as addressing this state law issue. The first 
state has the constitutional authority to preclude an award in the second state, but the first state 
may not wish to exercise its preclusive power. The McCartin rule can be interpreted as an 
attempt to answer this question by looking at the language in the first state's statute. The 
Court reviews this state law issue only because it must review the second forum's interpretation 
of the first state's law. See P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 51, 
at 505. This basis for Supreme Court review is absent when a state deliberately restricts its 
adjudicative or legislative jurisdiction. 
53. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (''The crucial inquiry, 
therefore, must be directed to determining whether [the regulation] is basically a protectionist 
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with 
effects upon interstate co=erce that are only incidental."); South Carolina State Highway 
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-. 
TIONAL LAW 21-30 (Supp. 1979). 
54. q. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (presump-
tion of constitutionality under "rational basis" test is based on assumption that state represents 
all interests fairly, and does not apply where this assumption cannot be made). One need not 
envision the Constitution as protecting almost entirely procedural values, see J. ELY, supra 
note 9, to recognize the validity of this concern. That the Constitution safeguards values inad-
equately protected by democratic procedure does not mean that the values in question are 
themselves procedural. The democratic process may inadequately protect freedom of religion 
values, and this may be a reason for granting them protection. But freedom of religion may be 
an end in itself, regardless of whether free exercise promotes democracy. 
1326 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1315 
careful consideration of all sides of the issue; proponents of each side 
are represented in the decision-making process. But there are no 
similar constraints on the formulation of multistate policy. Because 
a state does not bear the costs of its own overreaching, one state is 
unlikely to consider adequately the federal interest in protecting the 
needs of others. Rather, each state is bound to feel that it has chosen 
the better rule, and will be biased in favor of that rule in multistate 
cases.55 
The distinction between multistate and domestic policies should 
be relatively easy to apply because multistate policies are those that 
refer to state lines. They are relevant only when interstate relations 
are at issue, and are unnecessary to the disposition of any purely 
domestic disputes. For instance, a rule invalidating contracts made 
by married women constitutes a domestic policy choice. A principle 
that this rule applies to contracts made within the state, or to con-
tracts made by women residing in the state, constitutes a multistate 
policy choice. 
This relatively straightforward distinction is, moreover, implicit 
in several Supreme Court cases.56 Using the interest terminology, 
both Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission 57 
and Pac!ftc Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion58 upheld the application of California's workmen's compensa-
tion statute. The statute's choice-of-law provision unambiguously 
dictated application of California law. The Court did not dispose of 
the cases merely by reference to the statutory choice-of-law provi-
sions; rather, it seemed to recognize that purely multistate policies do 
not count even under a policy-oriented approach. There is even 
some circumstantial evidence that Brainerd Currie himself might 
have agreed, if the question were squarely presented, that interests 
result only from internal law policies.59 
55. One choice-of:law theory, in fact, explicitly requires a court to decide which is the 
"better law." Leflar, Co'!flicls Law: More on Choice-I'!fluencing Considerations, 54 CAL, L. 
R.Ev. 1584 (1966) (listing five factors, one of which is application of the better rule of law). 
This almost invariably turns out to be the forum's own rule of decision. 
56. See Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 C0LUM. L. 
R.Ev. 153, 162 n.49 (1949). 
57. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
58. 306 U.S. 493 (1939). The Court referred explicitly to domestic policy. 306 U.S. at 502-
03. 
59. For instance, in deciding whether other states had interests in a case, he analyzed only 
state internal law. His treatment of renvoi suggests the same conclusion - he tended to disre-
gard other states' choice-of-law rules in defining their interests: 
[I]t seems clear that the problem of the renvoi would have no place at all in the analysis 
that has been suggested. Foreign law would be applied only when the court has deter-
mined that the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and 
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This disregard of multistate policies does not mean that states are 
constitutionally precluded from adopting choice-of-law provisions. 
Such provisions indicate whether the state wishes to exercise legisla-
tive jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Constitution. 60 Satis-
faction of state choice-of-law provisions is a necessary condition to 
application of the domestic rule, and is an issue of state law.61 But 
policy to the case at bar and that the forum has none. Hence, there can be no question of 
applying anything other than the internal law of the foreign state. 
B. CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, supra note IO, at 177, 184. 
For other indications, see B. CURRIE, On the .Displacement of the Law of the Forum, supra note 
IO, at 3, 52 (distinguishing choice-of-law rules from "normal governmental policies"); B. CUR· 
RIE, supra, at 170 (criticizing legislative adoption of choice-of-law rules); B. CURRIE, supra, at 
52 ("A choice-of-law rule is an empty and bloodless thing. Actually, instead of declaring an 
overriding public policy, it proclaims the state's indifference to the result of the litigation."). 
60. There are, of course, constitutional limitations on the ways that a state may choose to 
exercise its jurisdiction. See note 9 supra. In addition, some of the difficulties that arise where 
the state uses substantively irrelevant variables to extend jurisdiction, see text at note 71 1iifra, 
apply in less virulent form where the state restricts its jurisdiction. This can be illustrated by a 
guest statute example. In conflicts cases, it is sometimes argued that guest statutes are designed 
to provide recovery for injured third parties, the suggestion being that where there is an out-of-
state third party or no third party at all, there is no interest in applying the guest statute. See, 
e.g., Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (Colorado 
guest statute protects Colorado insurers against fraudulent claims and gives injured third par-
ties priority over ungrateful guests). Yet states do not ordinarily allow the existence of insur-
ance to be raised at trial; it is deliberately made irrelevant, Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 413, so 
that absence of insurance would not defeat a state interest. 
Moreover, states with guest statutes never take account of whether there is a third party 
involved in purely domestic cases. For instance, one guest statute jurisdiction, Michigan, with 
a policy of priority for third parties, routinely applies its guest statute in domestic cases where 
no third party was involved, without even discussing whether this poses a statutory construc-
tion problem. See, e.g., Brooks v. Haack, 374 Mich. 261, 132 N.W.2d 13 (1965) (auto left 
straight and level road, traversed shallow ditch, and was demolished upon collision with utility 
pole); Karney v. Upton, 353 Mich. 262, 91 N.W.2d 297 (1958) (driver hit guardrail on bridge); 
Estate of Welty v. Estate of Wolfe, 345 Mich. 408, 76 N.W.2d 52 (1956) (wrongful death action 
against automobile owner's estate; auto left highway, collided with tree, killing owner and 
passenger); Stolt v. Shalogian, 326 Mich. 435, 40 N.W.2d 212 (1949) (car hit curve and turned 
over); Butine v. Stevens, 319 Mich. 176, 29 N.W.2d 325 (1947) (car left road and turned over); 
Bushie v. Johnson, 296 Mich. 8,295 N.W. 538 (1941) (passenger died when car hit tree); Sher-
man v. David, 293 Mich. 489,292 N.W. 464 (1940) (car rolled over; driver had been warned he 
was traveling too fast and was coming upon a curve); Holmes v. Wesler, 274 Mich. 655, 265 
N.W. 492 (1936) (vehicle hit telephone pole). 
The same result has been reached in Colorado. See, e.g., Rennels v. Marble Prods., Inc., 
175 Colo. 229, 486 P.2d 1058 (1971) (ex-wife (guest) against former husband (driver) and his 
corporation for injuries sustained when car hit bridge abutment); Loeffler v. Crandall, 129 
Colo. 384, 270 P.2d 769 (1954) (Colorado residents returning from trip to Mexico had accident 
in Colorado; car hit oily part of the road and skidded off). 
The reliance upon substantively irrelevant factors thus poses two questions. First, what 
accounts for the difference in attitude towards the factor in domestic and multistate cases? The 
answer may be that since there are special reasons for deference in multistate cases, using new 
variables to restrict jurisdiction is appropriate. Second, what other contacts must point to 
other states before factors irrelevant in purely domestic controversies are granted significance? 
Brilmayer, supra note 23, at 413-14. 
6 l. But see note 9 supra. Different issues are involved when the state admittedly has legis-
lative jurisdiction and uses multistate criteria in formulating rules to exercise it. Unless suspect 
classifications are involved, the state need only show a rational basis for different treatment in 
the equal protection context. See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, IOI S. Ct. 2434 (1981) (upholding state 
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satisfaction of state choice-of-law provisions does not guarantee that 
the state has met federal constitutional standards. State law is pre-
empted precisely on the issue of whether a constitutionally sufficient 
interest exists. Unqualified deference to state policy would trans-
form what is obviously a federal issue into an exercise in state statu-
tory construction. When properly circumscribed, however, state 
domestic policies play an important role in the determination of le-
gitimate interests. 
IL LEGITIMATE INTERESTS, DOMESTIC POLICIES, AND 
MULTISTATE POLICIES IN DISGUISE 
The Hague plurality concluded that a "significant aggregation of 
contacts . . . , creating interests,"62 justified the application of Min-
nesota law. Its reliance upon the concept of legitimate interests fol-
lows those modern choice-of-law cases63 that have suggested that a 
legitimate interest gives a state at least a prima facie claim to apply 
its law to a dispute.64 Essentially the same formulation is used re-
law providing different penalties for child abandonment totally within the state than for child 
abandonment followed by departure from the state). 
62. 100 S. Ct. at 644 (footnote omitted). 
63. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 
(1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Co., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Pacific Employers Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial 
Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
64. The language of prima facie claims is taken in a somewhat altered form from Alaska 
Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) ("Prima fade every 
state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted."). A prima facie 
claim will not necessarily put all constitutional objections to rest. Commerce clause cases pro-
vide one illustration. The state has a legitimate police power interest in regulating safety 
equipment on trucks on its highways. Nevertheless, the state's prima facie regulatory claim 
can be overridden if the state's regulations impose an unreasonable burden on commerce. See 
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In the choice-of-law context, a state's 
prima facie claim might give way for two reasons. First, this Article discusses primarily consti-
tutional choice-of-law limits derived from the constitutional value of state sovereignty. So 
defined, a legitimate interest might be overridden because other constitutional values such as 
fairness to litigants are violated. 
Second, one state's legitimate interest may in some cases be outweighed by another's. The 
Court thus balanced the interests of each jurisdiction, deciding which was superior. See 
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935) (conflicting 
interests of foreign state must be shown to be superior to displace law of interested forum). It 
is now settled that, at least in some instances, several states may have concurrent jurisdiction. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. at 637 (plurality opinion). And the Hague plurality 
opinion stated that there was no general requirement of balancing interests. 101 S. Ct. at 637 
n.10. Although it is thus not clear whether one state's interest could ever outweigh another 
state's interest, one such situation might be where the state of incorporation forbade cumula-
tive voting but the residence of some shareholders required it. q: Order of United Commer-
cial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1974) (need for uniformity in regulation of fraternal 
benefit society means that only law of place of incorporation can be applied); MITE Corp. v. 
Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 
12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (commerce clause limits on state regulation of tender offers). 
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gardless of whether the challenge to application of forum law is 
based upon article IV's full faith and credit clause65 or the due pro-
cess clause. 66 Indeed, the Court has never clearly defined the differ-
ent roles of these two provisions, 67 but uses them in conjunction to 
safeguard against unfairness to individuals and lack of respect for 
other states' laws. The concept of "legitimate interests" is relevant to 
both constitutional inquiries, 68 and in translating domestic policies 
into legitimate interests the key concept is "contacts." 
A. Contacts Creating Interests 
A contact is a circumstance - a person, event, or item of prop-
erty - that connects the controversy with one of the involved 
states.69 The plurality's reference to some aggregations of contacts as 
being significant suggests that not all in-state contacts support the 
application of forum law. Presumably the fact that Lavinia Hague's 
lawyer was licensed to practice in Minnesota would not create a 
Minnesota interest, even if her lawyer was working for a contingent 
65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § l. 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
67. Sometimes the Court relies on one clause, and sometimes on the other, and sometimes 
it even seems to be suggesting that the two constraints are identical. See Kirgis, The Roles of 
.Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Mar-
tin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 151 (1976); Martin, supra note 27. The 
wording of the full faith and credit clause implies that the clause applies only where the choice 
is between the laws of two states. Where the competing law is that of another nation, the only 
restriction is due process. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In other situations, the differences are obscure. 
The Hague opinions fared no better than most in untangling the two clauses. See 101 S. 
Ct. at 637 n.10 (plurality opinion) ("This Court has taken a similar approach in deciding 
choice-of-law cases under both the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
In each instance, the Court has examined the relevant contacts and resulting interests of the 
State whose law was applied."); 101 S. Ct. at 650 (Powell, J., dissenting). In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Stevens attempted to distinguish between the two clauses, but his approach 
was idiosyncratic. See 101 S. Ct. at 644-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). He stated, for example, 
that he doubted whether a state applying its own law ever violated due process. Because a 
judge would always be familiar with his own state's law, it could never be irrational to prefer 
it. 101 S. Ct. at 647. He concluded only that there might be an arguable due process objection 
if the rule was surprising or unfair as applied. 
68. See note 63 supra. Although an interest is, in general, a necessary condition for the 
application of forum law, one exception may be where neither state has an interest. In interest 
analysis terminology, this is the "unprovided for case." See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. 
KAY, supra note 38, at 275-83. Since this Article's definition of "interest" is considerably less 
restrictive than Brainerd Currie's, see text at note 127 i,!fra, this situation will arise only infre-
quently. One such case may be where the second state's choice-of-law rule disclaims a desire 
to have its law applied. 
69. A contact results from the geographic affiliation of a person; event, or item of property 
with one of the involved states. The word circumstance is here used generally to signify any 
element of the dispute that comprises a contact. In some cases, a failure to act may constitute a 
contact. See Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 90. Another possible contact with the forum might 
be the parties' selection of forum law in a contract. 
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fee.70 The Hague plurality gave scant indication of why it thought 
that Minnesota employment, in contrast, did. 
Criteria for assessing the legitimacy of interests can be derived 
from constitutional values recognized as important in the choice-of-
law process. Unfair surprise certainly plays a role in shaping consti-
tutional limits, but the concept of state sovereignty or territorial in-
tegrity is also important. Each state has a prima facie right to 
regulate domestic contacts - persons, property, or events affiliated 
with the state - but a state generally has no business regulating cir-
cumstances connected only with other states. The word "regulate" is 
being used here in a fairly expansive manner, meaning only that the 
state prescribes the contact's legal significance. 
Although circumstances that do not constitute forum contacts are 
not the proper subject of the state's attention, there are some situa-
tions in which a state must be able to prescribe their legal conse-
quences. Legal rules characteristically mandate the legal effect of a 
conjunction of circumstances that must all be satisfied for the effect 
to follow. In purely domestic cases, all of the relevant components 
of the cause of action are, by definition, in-state contacts. When a 
state applies its law to such cases, it does not intrude upon the sover-
eignty of other states because it does not prescribe the effects of 
events that occurred elsewhere. But in multistate cases, the circum-
stances that the rule governs may be divided among several states. 
The state whose rule is applied thus unavoidably dictates the legal 
results of occurrences elsewhere. Yet prescribing the legal signifi-
cance of out-of-state contacts is presumptively justifiable as a neces-
sary means to a legitimate end - regulation of the in-state contacts. 
An in-state contact, therefore, supplies a prima facie justification 
for the application of forum law when the rule in question is being 
used to regulate that contact. Application to occurrences elsewhere 
is incidental to this legitimate end. Absent a regulatory connection 
between the legal rule and the in-state contact, the rule does not pre-
scribe the consequences of any in-state contact, but merely regulates 
out-of-state occurrences. To illustrate, suppose that at the time of 
the accident, Hague had been acting in the course of his employ-
ment. If the issue were whether Minnesota or Wisconsin workmen's 
compensation law applied, then Minnesota employment would 
surely be a contact that created an interest.71 This is true even 
10. But see Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 560, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 
(1961) (mentioning Illinois residence of attorneys as relevant contact with Illinois). 
71. The plurality's citations to workmen's compensation cases in support of the relevance 
of Minnesota employment, 101 S. Ct. at 641, are for this reason inapposite. Alaska Packers 
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though the end result would be to prescribe the legal consequences 
of an out-of-state accident. It is impossible to avoid such a result 
because if Wisconsin workmen's compensation law were applied, 
this would prescribe the consequences of an employment relation-
ship located in Minnesota. 
But if the issue were not which workmen's compensation law to 
apply, but which state's speed limit, then Minnesota employment 
would clearly be irrelevant and Wisconsin law should be applied. 
Minnesota cannot claim to be using its speed limit to regulate Min-
nesota employment. Workmen's compensation rules regulate work-
ing, but traffi~ rules regulate driving, and the driving in question is 
not the proper subject of Minnesota's concern because it occurred 
elsewhere. Hague poses a problem between these two extremes. 
Whether Minnesota employment creates an interest in applying the 
insurance stacking rule depends upon whether there is some connec-
tion between stacking and employment status such that the rule 
seems designed to prescribe the legal consequences of Hague's em-
ployment. 
A forum contact justifies the application of state law on some 
issues but not on others because some legal rules regulate that con-
tact and some do not. This is the choice-of-law analog of what has 
been termed "specific jurisdiction" to adjudicate.72 Personal and 
legislative jurisdiction are not identical,73 but in both areas contacts 
related to the substantive issues in the case have greater significance 
in constitutionaljustification.74 This explains why a contact can give 
the forum personal jurisdiction to adjudicate certain claims against 
the defendant, but not others.75 Similarly, for choice-of-law pur-
Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935), and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939), were workmen's compensation cases; the 
fact of employment could hardly be more relevant. In substantive terms, workmen's compen-
sation schemes were obviously designed to regulate the employment relationship. By citing 
these cases, the plurality carelessly seemed to suggest that a contact significant for some issues 
would be significant for all. 
72. von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. 
L. REV. 1121, 1144-45 (1966). 
73. The Court consistently has recognized the analogy, but suggested that there are impor-
tant differences between the two issues. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, IOI S. Ct. 633, 644 
n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). For two discus-
sions of the similarities, see Martin, supra note 7; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Co LUM L. 
REV. 1587, 1589 (1978). 
74. In personal jurisdiction cases, of course, an unrelated contact not sufficient in itself may 
be sufficient in conjunction with many others. See Brilmayer, supra note 39. 
75. The best example is property, which establishes jurisdiction only if it is the subject 
matter of the litigation. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
I 86, 208-09 ( I 977). 
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poses the contact should be linked to the issue on which the states' 
laws differ because -the state must be using its law on that issue to 
regulate that contact. 
Most modem choice-of-law decisions are consistent with or even 
implicitly support this interpretation,76 but two cases are particularly 
instructive. In Home Insurance Co. v . .Dick11 the Supreme Court in-
validated Texas's attempt to disregard a contractual statute of limita-
tions provision. The contract had been entered into in Mexico, 
insured against a risk located in Mexico, and was subject to reinsur-
ance agreement by a New York company. The Court declared: 
"[N]othing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the con-
tracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in 
Texas."78 In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp .,19 the 
Court permitted Louisiana to apply its law regarding insurance con-
tracts. Although the contract was negotiated, issued, and delivered 
outside the forum state, the Watson Court distinguished .Dick be-
cause the insured-against risk occurred within the forum. The Wat-
son Court observed: "[The .Dick court] carefully pointed out that its 
decision might have been different had activities relating to the con-
tract taken place in Texas upon which the State could properly lay hold 
as a basis for regulation ."80 Taken together, the Watson and .Dick 
opinions support the requirement of a regulatory connection be-
tween the in-state contacts and the rule that the state wishes to apply. 
Although the Hague plurality and dissenting opinions skirted the 
issue of the proper method for assessing the constitutional signifi-
cance of contacts, they appear consistent with a requirement of a 
regulatory link. The dissenting opinion clearly had something of 
this sort in mind when it objected that "[t]he substantive issue here is 
solely one of compensation, and whether the compensation provided 
by this policy is increased or not will have no relation to the State's 
employment policies."81 Some language in the plurality opinion 
16. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964) (Florida had ample 
contacts with the transaction where insured-against risk occurred there); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 
U.S. 408,413 (1955) (state where tort occurs certainly has a concern in the problems following 
in the wake of injury); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 
542-43 (1935) (California had legitimate public interest in controlling and regulating Califor-
nia employer-employee relationship by app~g its workmen's compensation law), 
77. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
78. 281 U.S. at 408. See 281 U.S. at 408 n.5. 
79. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
80. 348 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added). 
81. 101 S. Ct. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting). See IOI S. Ct. at 653 (Powell, J,, dissenting) 
(Even if an insurer does business in the forum, "[t]he forum state has no interest in regulating 
that conduct of the insurer unrelated to property, persons or contracts executed within the 
forum State."). 
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suggests that the plurality also believed that Minnesota's right to reg-
ulate its employment relationships justified application of Minne-
sota's stacking law.82 Moreover, if the Court did not have in mind 
some sort of requirement of a relationship between the contact and 
the issue, then the contacts that it pointed to would support applica-
tion of forum law on any issue equally strongly. Since the modem 
view is that the relevance of contacts is a function of the issues in-
volved, 83 it seems reasonable to assume that the plurality did not 
mean to grant Minnesota employment talismanic significance for all 
legal issues. Some sort of link between this issue and the employ-
ment contact must, therefore, be shown. 
B. As Between State and Federal Law 
Two types of regulatory connections may link a forum contact 
with the rule that the state seeks to apply - formal substantive rele-
vance and informal policy relevance. For a contact to be formally 
relevant to a rule, the rule itself must be phrased in terms of the 
contact. Returning to_ an earlier example, the reason that we know 
that a workmen's compensation rule regulates employment is that it 
is phrased in terms of the consequences of employment. These rules 
also regulate accidents since they prescribe the consequences of hav-
ing an accident in the course of one's employment. Similarly, speed 
limits are phrased in terms of driving at different speeds. Thus both 
employment and accidents are formally relevant to workmen's com-
pensation, and the driving that led up to an accident is formally rele-
vant to the speed limit rule. But employment is not formally 
relevant to the speed limit rule, and Minnesota employment of the 
deceased does not make application of the Minnesota speed limit 
presumptively proper. By asking what facts a rule explicitly ad-
dresses, one can make an initial determination whether the rule reg-
ulates the in-state contact. 
Formal substantive relevance is not the only way that a forum 
contact can create a legitimate interest - informal policy relevance 
82. 101 S. Ct. at 641 ("Minnesota's workforce is surely affected by the level of protection 
the State extends to it, either directly or indirectly. Vindication of the rights of the estate of a 
Minnesota employee, therefore, is an important state concern."). 
83. The Second Restatement shares with interest analysis the principle that the policies 
underlying the competing rules are pertinent to deciding the relevance of forum contacts. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 6(2)(b), (c), (e) (1971). See Leflar, supra note 
55, at 1587 (fourth factor in choice-of-law process is advancement of forum's governmental 
interests). The plurality's casual citation to workmen's compensation cases suggests that it may 
think that if a contact is relevant to one issue, such as workmen's compensation, then it is 
relevant for all. See note 71 supra. But this is out of line with all modern theory, and conflicts 
with its apparent approval of policy-oriented approaches. 
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may also suffice. Formal substantive relevance is too stringent a test 
to capture all of the activities that the legislature or common-law 
judge meant to regulate by adopting a rule. Rules have traditionally 
been interpreted in light of their underlying policies as well as their 
explicit language because they may be addressed to problems not 
specifically mentioned. For instance, a consumer protection statute 
might be motivated by concern about overreaching by merchants. 
To further the statute's policy, the state might refuse to enforce any 
disclaimers of consumer warranties because it presumes that 
merchants procure these disclaimers through overreaching. Al-
though the state seeks to regulate overreaching, it does not require 
that the complaining party prove overreaching in each case. Even 
though not explicitly mentioned in the text of the rule, overreaching 
occurring within the state would constitute a constitutionally rele-
vant contact because it informs the statute's proper interpretation in 
domestic cases. 
A third type of relevance that does not supply a regulatory justifi-
cation greatly complicates the problem of assessing formal substan-
tive relevance and informal policy relevance. The forum contact 
may have only evidentiary rather than regulatory significance. The 
state may not be attempting to regulate the occurrence, but only us-
ing it as evidence that the regulated events took place. For example, 
the defendant's legal ownership and possession of an automobile 
may be probative of whether he was the driver of an automobile in a 
hit-and-run accident. But the state does not apply its hit-and-run 
statutes to regulate automobile ownership because ownership itself is 
not important.84 Hit-and-run rules regulate driving, having acci-
dents, and leaving the scene; these would be significant contacts but 
ownership, per se, would not. Whether formally or informally re-
lated to the rule, a constitutionally relevant contact must possess reg-
ulatory, not merely evidentiary, value. 
To ascertain whether a rule regulates the in-state contact, one 
consults its language and underlying policies. But the existence of a 
regulatory nexus, and hence, a legitimate interest cannot be mechan-
ically determined. There is no list of intrinsically significant contacts 
to consult, especially with respect to informal policy relevance. Be-
cause the number and scope of a rule's underlying policies are debat-
able, disagreements about the constitutional status of certain 
contacts are inevitable. This causes a serious problem. Since a state 
court has wide latitude to state a rule's underlying policies, it might 
84. Of course, ownership, per se, could be important if other rules, such as a vicarious 
liability rule, were at stake. 
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rely upon dubious domestic policies to satisfy itself that constitu-
tional requirements are met. 
Even if courts restrict their regulatory justifications to domestic 
policies, states nevertheless apparently possess methods for evading 
the federal constitutional limits on choice of law. The assessment of 
informal policy involves the interpretation of state statutes and case 
law, and so is a matter of state law. Each state may define its own 
substantive goals, including both formal criteria for application of a 
rule and the rule's implicit regulatory purposes. In Hague, for in-
stance, the Minnesota Supreme Court could assert that, as a matter 
of state law, the stacking rule regulates employment. And because 
federal courts generally lack authority to reverse a state's interpreta-
tion of its own law, 85 this proclamation arguably should be disposi-
tive. State courts possess seemingly unreviewable discretion that 
they can use to evade the constitutional issue. Instead of alluding to 
an explicit multistate policy the state merely rephrases the policy in 
domestic regulatory terms. It need not say that Minnesota wishes to 
apply its law where the deceased was employed in the state; it just 
discerns an intent to regulate employment through insurance stack-
ing. By thus "creatively'' interpreting a rule's policies, state courts 
would be able to attribute constitutional significance to in-state con-
tacts, and effectively decide for themselves the scope of constitu-
tional limits on choice of law. · 
C. Expressions ef .Domestic Interest 
Where the state has asserted explicit multistate policies, the 
proper Supreme Court response is relatively simple: ignore them. 
Multistate policies are not as easily disregarded, however, when dis-
guised as domestic regulatory justifications because it is harder to 
identify them. Yet a policy so disguised is no less objectionable on 
that score. It is still a purely multistate policy: because it serves no 
purpose in purely domestic cases, its relevance is conditioned upon 
the presence ofmultistate variables. To insure that a state court does 
not manipulate its statement of a rule's domestic policies to enable 
its action to survive constitutional scru~y, spurious regulatory justi-
fications must be discounted. There are two possible ways to accom-
plish this goal. 
First, the Court could evaluate the supposed regulation empiri-
85. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). But cf. Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (denial of state-created right to a jury trial not merely a matter 
of state procedural law; arguably an instance of "liberty or property" clause exception dis-
cussed in text at notes 92-95 iefra ). 
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cally, asking whether the rule in question actually regulates the con-
tact effectively. Such an inquiry into the substantive reasonableness 
of the purported regulatory justification is reminiscent of the old-
fashioned substantive due process. In its effort to uncover pretense, 
the Court would risk invalidating bona fide attempts to regulate in-
state activities because, in the Court's view, the regulatory means are 
ineffectual or misconceived. Furthermore, if it invalidates existing 
domestic policies as applied to choice-of-law cases, then it must ei-
ther invalidate their use in domestic cases also, or have different tests 
for efficacy in the domestic and choice-of-law contexts. The Court 
should be as reluctant to intrude on a state's legitimate efforts to for-
mulate its own law86 as to defer to any and all hypothesized justifica-
tions. 87 
The alternative to substantive review of asserted regulatory justi-
fications is.insistence that some objective manifestation in the state's 
internal law support the asserted policy. Under this approach, fed-
eral law would not tell a state what domestic policies it may adopt; 
federal law would merely require that the state itself has demonstra-
bly chosen them. Thus, instead of challenging the ttffecacy of a regu-
latory policy, the Supreme Court need only require proof of its 
existence. This second standard of federal review may seem novel in 
the conflicts context, but it finds support in three analogous areas of 
constitutional litigation: property clause, contract clause, and ade-
quate state procedural ground cases. 
As in the choice-of-law setting, constitutional limits in property 
and contract clause cases protect interests defined by state law. The 
Constitution's due process and contract clauses prevent the states 
from "depriving" individuals ofproperty88 and "impairing" the obli-
gation of contracts. 89 These clauses do not themselves create prop-
86. In "fundamental rights" cases where the Court has applied strict scrutiny, it has empir-
ically evaluated the asserted justification. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-
38 (1969) (investigating empirical basis for argument that waiting period for welfare benefits 
facilitates budget predictability). 
87. The comparison between due process low-level scrutiny and the standard of review 
proposed in this Article is discussed in the text at notes 108-09 i'!fra. The "rational basis" test 
would allow virtually any regulatory justification to be hypothesized after the fact. See, e.g., 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set 
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."). q: Schweiker v. Wil-
son, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Court should receive with some 
skepticism post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose"). 
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law''). 
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (''No State shall ..• pass any .•• Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts"). 
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erty and contract rights;90 instead, they "[throw] a federal 
constitutional shield around property interests initially created by 
state law."91 For this reason, the state courts' conceded authority to 
shape substantive law apparently would enable them to defeat con-
stitutional claims. State courts might manipulate state legal doctrine 
to deny that a property interest had ever been created92 or a contract 
formed.93 This, of course, the Court has not permitted. "[I]n order 
that the constitution may not become a dead letter"94 the Court has 
assumed a limited federal power to review state law issues. It does 
not determine what state law ought to be, but only what it has been 
all along - to meet a constitutional challenge, state-created defini-
tions must find a "fair and substantial basis" in existing state law.95 
A related federal limitation on state lawmaking power involves 
the adequacy of alternative state procedural grounds in cases that 
involve federal issues. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court will not de-
cide the federal issues in a case if an adequate and independent state 
procedural ground supports the decision below.96 There remains, 
however, a possibility that state courts will adjust procedural doc-
trine solely to escape constitutional commands. In fact, many of 
these independent state ground cases involved apparently hostile 
90. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972); Demorest v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944); Indiana ex rel Ander-
son v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); Hale v. State Board, 302 U.S. 95 (1937); Broad River Power 
Co. v. South Carolina ex rel Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930). 
91. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 435 (1977). See 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."). 
92. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938). See generally Hale, 
The Supreme Court and the Contracts Clause, 51 HARV. L. REV. 512, 621, 824 (1944). 
93. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
94. Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938). See Monaghan, supra note 
91, at 435. Novelty is suspect because novel state grounds may be motivated by the desire to 
defeat the federal claim. See Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 
157, 164 (1917); Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketchum, 194 U.S. 579,589 (1904) (to 
allow untenable construction ''would open an easy method of avoiding the jurisdiction of this 
court"). 
95. Demorest v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944); Broad River Power 
Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930). 
96. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 
441, 443 (1935). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra 
note 51, at 526; Hill, The Inadequate Stale Ground, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 943 (1965); Sandalow, 
Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals For a Revised JJoctrine, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 187 [hereinafter cited as Sandalow); Note, The Untenable No'!federal Ground in 
the Supreme Court, 14 HARV. L. REV. 1375 (1961). State procedural requirements that do not 
satisfy due process requirements, however, clearly cannot bar Supreme Court review. See 
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 
(1930); Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917). 
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Southern courts deciding constitutional issues in civil rights cases.97 
For obvious reasons, the Court has not been inclined to accuse states 
of evading constitutional requirements and has not framed its test in 
terms of evasion: "Inquiry into the intent of a state court is suffi-
ciently hazardous and the likely results of such doubtful utility that it 
ought not to be undertaken."98 But the Court has not ignored the 
possibility. Instead, it has tried to use objectively measurable crite-
ria.99 Thus, if the Court finds that the state procedural ground is 
novel, 100 unsubstantial, 101 or "not strictly or regularly followed," 102 it 
may hear the constitutional issues. In asking whether there is ade-
quate support in prior case law, 103 the Court acts comparably to a 
federal court sitting in diversity and deciding an issue of state law. 104 
It decides not what state law ought to be, but rather what the state's 
precedents indicate that the law presently is. 105 
97. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958). q: Demorest v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 49 (1944) (Doug-
las, J., concurring); Fox River Co. v. Railroad Commn., 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1926) (where state 
law has not been manipulated to evade federal right, state decision will stand). Henry v. Mis-
sissippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), also required that a state procedural rule serve a "legitimate state 
interest." Other cases have not similarly scrutinized .procedural rules, and this Article does not 
rely on that part of the Henry holding. But see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,512 n.7 (1978) 
("Failure to present a federal question in conformance with state procedure constitutes an 
adequate and independent ground of decision barring review in this Court, so long as the State 
has a legitimate interest in enforcing its procedural rule."). It is interesting, however, to note 
how much this part of the Henry holding resembles the possibility, rejected here, that the 
Court should analyze purported justifications in terms of whether they constitute an empirically 
ejfective regulatory scheme. See text at note 86 supra. 
98. Sandalow, supra note 96, at 219. "A purported state ground is not independent and 
adequate . . . where the circumstances give rise to an inference that the state court is guilty of 
an evasion." Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting). But "[t]his 
charge upon the integrity of a State Supreme Court is so serious that this Court has restricted 
such findings to cases where the state court decision lacked 'fair support' in the state law." 349 
U.S. at 399 n.3 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
99. See Sandalow, supra note 96, at 221. 
100. NAACP v. Alabaiba ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) ("Novelty in pro• 
cedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those 
who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal 
constitutional rights."). See Missouri ex rel Mo. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313,320 (1930). 
101. Lawrence v. State Tax Commn., 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932) ("Even though the claimed 
constitutional protection be denied on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to 
inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsub-
stantial, constitutional obligations may not thus be avoided."). 
102. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964). 
103. See Note, supra note 96, at 1385. 
104. q: Note, No Evidence to Support a Conviction - The Supreme Court's Decisions in 
Thompson v. City of Louisville and Gamer v. Louisiana, 110 U. PA. L. REv. l 137, 1143 (1962) 
(contrasting the Federal court's function when it sits in diversity where it decides what state 
law to apply with its role when reviewing state court decision). 
105. The reason for the requirement is explained in Sandalow, supra note 96, at 221: 
When a state ground of decision is supported by a history of consistent application, even 
in cases that do not involve a federal claim, it is not likely to have been used by the state 
court simply as a device to defeat the Court's jurisdiction. 
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In one respect, the insistence on evidence of a regulatory connec-
tion in the text of the statute, its legislative history, or the case law 
may be too demanding. The first opportunity for judicial considera-
tion of a substantively relevant fact may arise, by coincidence, in a 
multistate dispute. This is particularly likely to occur where the state 
court has had few opportunities to construe the statute. A require-
ment of a prior expression of the regulatory interest ties the court's 
hands, and impedes the normal processes of statutory construction. 
One could argue that this coincidence is so unlikely, and the need for 
safeguards so great, that this cost must be bome. 106 But a more at-
tractive solution is to allow the state court to construe the domestic 
statute, and then utilize those factors that it has worked into the sub-
stance of the legal issue as significant contacts for choice-of-law pur-
poses. When an arguable new construction of the state statute 
presents itself, the Supreme Court should remand the case to the 
This is just one instance of a general phenomenon: reducing the latitude for prejudice by tying 
the results of one decision to other decisions in which such prejudice is absent and the rewards 
for competent decision making are substantial. To put it another way, prejudice is restricted 
by making invidious criteria irrelevant and requiring the same rule to be applied in one situa-
tion as in the other. Usually, this means requiring similar treatment of favored and disfavored 
classes of individuals. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 9, at 83-85 (outlining theory of ''virtual 
representation" underlying the privileges and immunities clause). But ''virtual representation" 
also applies to cases. In the present context, multistate cases are tied to domestic cases, for in 
the latter, the state's policy decisions can be assumed to be sound. In the contracts, property, 
and state procedural ground contexts, cases with constitutional objections are tied, similarly, to 
cases in which there are none. 
Another context in which the tying phenomenon occurs is stare decisis and neutral princi-
ples. General lawmaking power is tied to the decision of concrete cases, each function restrict-
ing the other. The potential for biased resolution of particular cases (because, for instance, of 
prejudice against particular litigants) is checked by the fact that the resolution will affect future 
cases. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 108-09 
(1976). The case-deciding functions provide reciprocal safeguards against irresponsible for-
mulation of legal rules, since the rule must be applied to the case at hand. This last fact 
underlies some of the objections to making purely prospective judicial decision making. Link-
letter v. Walker, 366 U.S. at 225 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Note, 
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 
(1962). 
Another example, particularly appropriate for choice-of-law purposes, can be found in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 261 n.11 
(1971). In elaborate dicta, Justice Brennan argued that out-of-staters would be adequately 
protected in abstention cases only where the resulting interpretation of state law would have 
future applications. Diversity jurisdiction seeks to protect outsiders from local prejudice, and 
the federal court could safely abstain when the state court would be adequately restrained by 
the implications of its decision for nondiversity cases. 
For a discussion of the dangers of ad hoc decision making, see McGautha v. California, 
402 U.S. 183, 259, discussing Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (Supreme Court 
resolved dispute through analysis of prior state case law); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 
(1961); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER. supra note 51, at 617-18, 620 
("Doesn't the express announcement of the new construction as generally governing the state 
in the future itself provide some safeguard?"); Note, supra note 104; Note, The Void-for-Vague-
ness J)octrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 80 (1960). 
106. See Sandalow, supra note 96, at 221. 
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state court for clarification of the substantive law. 107 
There are superficial similarities between this requirement of an 
expression of domestic regulatory interest and a proposal advanced 
by Professor Gerald Gunther for equal protection challenges. 108 In 
both equal protection and conflict-of-laws cases, the danger is that 
states may try to meet constitutional objections with post hoc ratio-
nalizations that have no relation to actual and invidious motivations 
behind the challenged actions. In a well-known article, Professor 
Gunther argued that when a state defends a statute from an equal 
protection challenge, it should be limited to policy justifications that 
played some part in the statute's enactment. Professor Gunther's 
equal protection proposal, like this Article's recommended standard 
of review, seeks to prevent states from arbitrarily inventing policies 
to save their actions from constitutional attack. 
As an equal protection doctrine, the prior articulation require-
ment has been trenchantly criticized.109 Although designed to en-
courage legislatures to air publicly the policies upon which they are 
relying, the proposal arguably would have a quite different effect. 
An articulation requirement would have its greatest effect on statutes 
of states that do not compile extensive legislative histories and on 
statutes that seemed innocent of constitutional defects when enacted. 
The first factor is irrelevant to the law's constitutionality, and the 
second seems actually to evince validity. Moreover, legislatures are 
likely to respond to a prior articulation requirement by appending to 
the legislative· record a laundry list of policy considerations. The 
prophylactic value of such an exercise is unclear. Rationalizations 
are rationalizations, whether offered at the litigation or the enact-
ment stage. Advancing the deadline for offering those rationaliza-
tions merely increases the paperwork necessary to enact a statute. 
The contrast with the superficially similar choice-of-law require-
ment is pronounced. Restricting regulatory justifications to factors 
significant to the substance of the dispute is not designed to en-
107. q. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940) (remanding to state court for 
clarification of whether state or federal law was the basis for decision). 
108. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -Foreword· In Search of Evolving .Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-46 
(1972). 
109. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 9, at 125-31. Although some cases indicate agreement 
with the articulation model, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307, 314 (1976); Weinberger v. Wissenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 650 (1975); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 
U.S. 263,270 (1973), for the most part the Court seems to ignore it. See J. ELY, supra note 9, 
at 125; G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 216-17 (9th ed. 
Supp. 1979). q. Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
("the Court should receive with some skepticism post hoc hypotheses about legislative pur-
poses"). 
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courage the earlier decision makers publicly to express additional 
domestic substantive policies. Articulation itself is not the touch-
stone of constitutionality; independent substantive usefulness is. To 
the extent that the requirement induces states to air their domestic 
policies, this arguably would beneficially clarify domestic law and 
identify the multistate circumstances in which a state would apply its 
domestic law. 110 But the real reason for the insistence that contacts 
serve some domestic substantive function is to limit choice-of-law 
policy justifications to policies on which the state is entitled to 
rely. 111 The statute's domestic ramifications provide real safeguards 
because they mean that some domestic group will feel the statute's 
pinch. Without a regulatory nexus requirement, states could conjure 
up different sets of policies for multistate cases, at no cost to state 
residents, and solely to evade constitutional limitations. 
In both conflict-of-law and equal protection cases, a silent record 
creates an inference that no one ever found it important to articulate 
the policy justification now being o.ff ered. In equal protection cases, 
however, there is an innocent explanation: given the record-keeping 
costs or the statute's apparent constitutional innocence, constitu-
tional rationalization seemed unwarranted. In conflicts cases, in 
contrast, there are no additional record-keeping costs because states 
are not asked to create special records solely to meet later constitu-
. tional challenges. The fact that a state has not articulated a given 
policy in domestic cases, and cannot now work it into the substance 
of the dispute, is highly probative of invalidity. It suggests that the 
state is relying upon illicit multistate policies that cannot support any 
legitimate interest because they have no substantive relevance to the 
issue in question. 
Ill. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTACT IN HAGUE 
Although the plurality thought three contacts constitutionally rel-
110. In this way, a "regulatory purpose" requirement improves the predictability of con-
flicts rules because the list of factors triggering application of forum law is limited to those 
already defined by the state's domestic law. 
111. Another distinction between Professor Gunther's approach and mine is that equal 
protection a.nalysis is primarily concerned with means-end relationships, whereas my standard 
concerns what constitutes an appropriate end. Only goals that inform policies in domestic 
cases can be utilized as "ends" in choice-of-law analysis. Certainly any means is legitimate if 
there is no restriction on what ends are chosen, because the rule could be cited as an end in 
itself. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205, 
1248 (1970). Equal protection analysis usually involves one of the state's virtually infinite 
legitimate health or safety goals, and asks whether the means is rationally related to that goal 
Choice-of-law analysis cannot use the "rational relationship" test, however, until a legitimate 
domestic goal is brought to light. The "prior expression of a domestic interest" requirement 
seeks to discover whether such a legitimate goal exists. 
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evant, we are concerned here only with one: Minnesota employ-
ment. The employment contact is singled out because the plurality 
evidently attributed great importance to it, and may have been using 
it to establish a regulatory justification.112 Since it is not clear 
whether the plurality would agree to limit itself to policies useful in 
the domestic setting, as this Article suggests, criticism of an alterna-
tive interpretation of the plurality opinion will follow the demonstra-
tion that the requirement of a domestic substantive policy is not met 
in Hague. 
There are two possible ways to try to establish a domestic sub-
stantive connection between Minnesota employment and Minne-
sota's stacking law. Minnesota might be interested in the 
employment relationship itself, regardless of the employee's domi-
cile, because the employment occurs in Minnesota and involves a 
Minnesota employer. In the alternative, Minnesota might argue that 
anyone who works in Minnesota deserves protection under Minne-
sota law in his own right. In other words, Hague would be entitled 
to the benefits of Minnesota citizenship by virtue of membership in 
the Minnesota workforce. The first rationale suggests that a right to 
regulate arises from concern over a relationship with a Minnesota 
employer. The second bases the right to regulate upon an interest in 
Hague himself. 
An initial and obvious problem with both of these is that the sup-
posed interest was supplied by the Supreme Court. Because state 
policies ideally should be the product of statutory construction or 
interpretation of common-law rules, it is not clear that the Court 
should supply a regulatory justification that the state court did not 
advance. 113 This is particularly problematic where, as here, the state 
court had purported to analyze completely all the underlying policies 
and did not mention the one that the Supreme Court unearthed. But 
this issue is beside the more interesting point: would Minnesota em-
ployment be a sufficient contact if offered by the state court? If there 
is even a minimal requirement that the purported justification find 
expression in domestic regulatory policy, the answer is clearly "no." 
112. A caveat is in order: the plurality stressed the existence of a "significant aggregation 
of contacts between the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests." Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633,644 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). It expressed no 
view as to whether the "employment" or the "doing business" contacts, "either together or 
separately, would have sufficed to sustain the choice of Minnesota law made by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court." 101 S. Ct. at 644 n.29 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
113. q: Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 731-37 (198l)(Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (Supreme Court should not uphold state law that the state court had declared inva-
lid under the fourteenth amendment because it promoted no rational state objective). 
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Consider first the theory that Minnesota's stacking rule regulates 
the employment relationship. As a general matter, secondary 
sources canvassing the policy considerations favoring stacking do 
not mention employment.114 Likewise, the common-law decisions 
initiating stacking in various states have not mentioned any policies 
implicating employment.115 More important is Minnesota law spe-
114. Secondary sources have identified the relevant arguments for and against insurance 
stacking. The issue has usually turned on the court's interpretation of the state's uninsured 
motorist statute. See generally A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
§ 8.6 (1969 & Supp. 1980); Allen, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Alabama, 36 ALA. LAW. 535 
(1975); Hart, Stacking of Motor Vehicle Insurance Coverage in Missouri: 2X the .Deep Pocket, 
35 J. Mo. B. 173 (1979); Neighbor, Pyramiding Uninsured Motorist Coverage - Has Iowa 
Joined the Majority, 23 DRAKE INS. L. ANN. 746 (1974); Comment, The Invalidity of the "Other 
Insurance" Provision: A New Majority, 17 S.D. L. REv. 152 (1972); Note, Stacked Recovery 
Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement of the Automobile Liability Policy, 9 VAL. L. REv. 
135 (1974); Comment, Stacking of Basic Economic Loss Benefits Under the Minnesota No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance Act, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 421 (1979); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d·551 
(1969). 
The commentators point to two recurrent rationales for insurance stacking: (I) to provide 
indemnification for the insured against losses caused by the wrongful conduct of an uninsured 
motorist; and (2) to allow the insured rather than the insurer to benefit from the premiums 
that have been paid. See, e.g., Comment, The Invalidity of the "Other Insurance" Provision, 
supra, at 156; Note, supra, at 144. 
The commentators also indicate that those jurisdictions that do not permit the stacking of 
insurance policies typically interpret their uninsured motorist statutes to afford the same pro-
tection that the injured party would have received if the uninsured motorist had carried the 
minimum insurance. Neighbor, supra; Comment, The Invalidity of the "Other Insurance" Pro-
vision, supra, at 160. 
It does not appear that any secondary source has argued that employment regulation is 
relevant to the issue of insurance stacking. 
115. The Virginia Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court were the first courts to 
identify a public policy in favor of stacking uninsured motorist insurance. Neither court con-
sidered the regulation of employment in reaching their decisions. In Bryant v. State Farm 
Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965), the court struck down an "other insurance" 
provision that limited the amount that the insurer had to pay. Noting that the uninsured 
motorist statute was enacted for the benefit of injured persons, the court held that any insur-
ance policy provision that conflicted with the statute was void. 205 Va. at 901, 140 S.E.2d at 
819. 
The Florida Supreme Court, in Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 
689 (Fla. 1966), stated that the policy behind the Florida uninsured motorist statute was to 
compensate the insured for his actual losses. Accordingly, the insured can stack insurance to 
the extent of his damages. 185 So. 2d at 692. The court did not mention employment. Accord, 
Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Okla. 1971), revd., 464 
F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606,243 So. 2d 736 (1970); 
Fidelty & Cas. Co. v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169, 286 A.2d 288 (1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, 177 S.E.2d 257 (1970); Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
55 Hawaii 326,518 P.2d 1399 (1974); Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 148 Ind. App. 548,267 
N.E.2d 859 (1971); Benzer v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Assn., 216 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1974); 
Clayton v. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co., 212 Kan. 640, 512 P.2d 507 (1973); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 85,259 So. 2d 
22 (1972); Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d 786 (1972); 
Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,207 N.W.2d 348 (1973); Bose v. American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 186 Neb. 209, 181 N.W.2d 839 (1970); Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 
N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974); Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 155 
S.E.2d 128 (1967); Curran v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 266 N.E.2d 566 
(1971); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968); Pickering v. 
American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971); Boyd v. State Farm Mut. 
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cifically. An exhaustive computerized search of Minnesota case law 
uncovered no suggestion that employment and insurance stacking 
are related.116 Not surprisingly, neither plaintiffs nor defendants 
have ever found it worthwhile to allege or deny employment in 
stacking cases;117 it is hard to understand how this fact would add 
Auto. Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 316, 195 S.E.2d 706 (1973); Westphal v. Amco Ins. Co., 87 S.D. 404, 
209 N.W.2d 555 (1973); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972). 
The only time that the Florida courts have mentioned employment has been when the 
injured party was involved in an accident in the course of his employment and sought to stack 
his employer's uninsured motorist policies. The courts limit insurance stacking to situations 
where a familial relationship exists between the insured and the injured party. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Richendollar, 368 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Pac, 337 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (per curiam). But see Lezcano v. 
Leatherby Ins. Co., 372 So. 2d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam); United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Curry, 371 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam). The 
focus is on the interest of the injured party and the parties to the insurance contract, not on any 
generalized employment interest. 
A Lexis search of all states produced no cases involving insurance stacking in which the 
court considered regulation of employment to resolve the stacking issue. The following search 
was run: 
Level 1: insurance w/seg stack! - 1021 cases 
Level 2: w/seg employ! or work-741 cases 
Level 3: w/seg vehicle or automobile or car - 403 cases 
Level 4: w/seg uninsured - 168 cases 
The cases in levels 1, 2, and 3 were randomly scanned. Each case in level 4 was checked. 
116. In Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,207 N.W.2d 348 (1973), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court identified the factors underlying its stacking rule: 
[T)he fact that the legislature required an uninsured-motorist provision in all policies, 
added to the fact that a premium has been collected on each of the policies involved, 
should result in the policyholder's receiving what he paid for on each policy, up to the ftlll 
amount of his damages .... [T]rue ... such [a] holding results in Jlermissible recovery 
exceeding what he would have received if the uninsured motorist had been insured for the 
minimum amount .... But if the question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a 
windfall, it seems more just that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he 
paid for rather than that the insurer should escape liability for that which it collected a 
premium. 
296 Minn. at 187,207 N.W.2d at 351-52. The court did not mention employment. Nor have 
the Minnesota cases subsequent to Van Tassel identified any nexus between employment and 
the decision to allow or disallow the stacking of insurance benefits. See, e.g., Roepke v. West-
ern Natl. Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1981); Koons v. National Family Ins. Co., 301 
N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 1981); Wallace v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1980); Hen-
nekens v. All Nation Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1980); Petty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1980); Holman v. All Nations Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980); 
Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn, 1979); 
Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1978); Hennen v. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., 312 Minn. 131,250 N.W.2d 840 (1977); National Gen. Ins. Co. v. American Standard 
Ins. Co., 311 Minn. 415, 249 N.W.2d 453 (1977); Integrity Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Auto & Cas. 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976); Taylor v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 
305 Minn. 446, 234 N.W.2d 590 (1975); Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 191, 207 
N.W.2d 535 (1973). 
117. The only cases that arguably give rise to an employer's interest in allowing insurance 
stacking are those cases that allow the workmen's compensation carrier to set off the amounts 
paid under the uninsured motorist policies. See Boehler v. Insurance Co., 290 F. Supp. 867 
(E.D. Ark. 1968) (Arkansas Workmen's Compensation law allows employer's carrier to set off 
the amount paid under the uninsured motorist policy); Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. 
Oelke, 120 Ga. App. 667, 172 S.E.2d 183 (1969), revd., 266 Ga. 310, 174 S.E.2d 920 (1970) 
(Court of Appeals allowed set-off by workmen's compensation carrier but was reversed by the 
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anything to the merits of the case. It is similarly difficult to compre-
hend how a prospective domestic construction of the stacking rule 
might take employment into account. In substantive terms, employ-
ment is utterly superfluous. In fact, in Hague the plaintiff did not 
claim that her husband's employment was relevant to the merits; em-
ployment was alleged only for choice-of-law purposes.118 
Minnesota can hardly claim, therefore, that its stacking rule regu-
lates the employment relationship. The second explanation, that 
Minnesota considers members of its work force entitled to all of the 
advantages that it bestows upon citizens, is equally untenable. One 
could argue that Minnesota "cares" about employees in the way that 
it "cares" about residents. This is certainly a plausible interpretation 
of the plurality's language: 
While employment status may implicate a state.interest less substantial 
than does resident status, that interest is nevertheless important. The 
State of employment has police power responsibilities towards the non-
resident employee that are analogous, if somewhat less profound, than 
towards residents. Thus, such employees use state services and ameni-
ties and may call upon state facilities in appropriate circumstances.119 
But even if one grants that application of forum law should, like 
state services, be limited to residents, it is unclear.why in-state em-
ployment would entitle a claimant to the benefits of Minnesota law. 
It seems hardly more persuasive than bestowing those benefits upon 
all persons who had once resided in the state, or persons who owned 
Georgia Supreme Court). Cf. Hackman v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 87, 261 
A.2d 433 (1970) (court approved set-off but did not resolve whether the workmen's compensa-
tion carrier or the uninsured motorist carrier should receive the subrogation rights). But see 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 252 Ark. 624, 480 S.W.2d 
585 (1972) (Arkansas workmen's compensation law does not allow set-oft). These cases are 
irrelevant to our discussion because the accident giving rise to a workmen's compensation 
claim must occur during the course of employment. The employment interests are triggered 
by this fact, not by the issue of insurance stacking. 
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly ruled against such a set off by the 
workmen's compensation carrier. Janzen v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Minn. 
1979), held that although the workmen's compensation law gives the compensation carrier a 
right to be subrogated to the rights of the injured party against third-party tortfeasors, an 
uninsured motorist liability carrier is not a tortfeasor. For further discussion on this topic, see 
A. Wm1ss, supra note 114, § 2.67; Note, Uninsured Motorist Insurance Offeet for Workmen's 
Compensation Benefits, 26 ARK. L. REv. 570 (1973); Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in 
Louisiana, 24 LOY. L. REV. 85, 108-09 (1978); Note, Workmen's Compensation - Subrogation 
-Liability of Uninsured Motorist Callier, 22 MERCER L. REv. 621 (1971). 
I 18. Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 104-05 (rejecting as a basis for personal jurisdiction 
property that is alleged only for jurisdictional purposes). While it may be sufficient in the 
personal jurisdiction context to establish relevance to the case in general, in choice of law the 
contact must be substantively relevant to the issue on which the state's laws differ. In Hague, 
employment was irrelevant to any of the legal issues. But even if there were some substantive 
purpose for alleging employment, this would be insufficient if that purpose were unrelated to 
the stacking issue in the case. 
119. 101 S. Ct. at 640-41. 
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real property there, or persons with Minnesota relatives. On what 
theory would employees evoke such solicitude? 
A canvass of Minnesota's social welfare statutes demonstrates 
that the plurality's analogy between employees and residents is un-
founded. Eligibility for Minnesota State Assistance is, by a general 
provision, conditioned upon residence, not employment in the 
state.120 Many other social benefit statutes also afford preferential 
treatment based upon residence. 121 The only benefits that refer to 
employment are those that the state provides to employees in the 
employment context. 122 The state's "police power responsibilities" 
toward employees are, indeed, "somewhat less profound, than to-
wards residents."123 When Minnesota foots the bill, it cares very lit-
tle about its work force. The solicitude that the Supreme Court 
imputed to Minnesota seems peculiar to choice-of-law cases in which 
such solicitude rationalizes the application of Minnesota law. 
The obvious lack of any domestic policy foundation for drawing 
a regulatory connection between employment and the stacking rule 
suggests that the plurality must have had another sort of justification 
in mind. Its failure to explain how employment supports application 
of the insurance stacking rule is frustrating. At one point the plural-
ity contended that Minnesota had an interest in applying its law be-
cause affording compensation to the estate of a Minnesota employee 
"surely affected"124 its work force. Perhaps, then, the thrust of its 
reasoning was that the existence of some empirical consequences in 
the state should be enough, regardless of whether the empirical con-
sequences are significant in light of existing domestic policy. 
In view of the arguments already offered, it is not clear why a 
contact should count when the state has accorded it no legal rele-
vance and the sole purpose for alleging it is to justify application of 
forum law. But even if a domestic relevance test is not adopted, an 
actual effects test is unacceptable in theory and as applied. As ap-
120. See MINN. STAT. §§ 256.455-.456 (1974). This includes aid to the needy, see MINN. 
STAT. § 256B.06; tuition subsidies, loans, and scholarships at the state university, see MINN, 
STAT. §§ 136A.121, .161(3) (1974); and soldiers' welfare funds, see MINN. STAT. § 197.03 
(1974). 
121. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 128A.07 (West 1979) (resident preference for admis-
sion to state schools for the deaf); MINN. STAT. §§ 248.03-.04 (1974) (residents given prefer-
encial treatment after graduating from state schools for the deaf); MINN. STAT. §§ 246.23, 
256D. 18 (1974) (residents given preferential treatment at mental institutions). 
122. For instance, employers must make health plans available to their employees. See 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 62E (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 254.Al2 (West Supp. 1980) 
(county may provide drug abuse service to employers for their employees). 
123. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633, 640 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
124. 101 S. Ct. at 641. 
June 1981] Legitimate Interests 1347 
plied, the test does not require any empirical showing of substantial 
impact on the Minnesota work force .. Yet most members of the work 
force are likely to be indifferent to the Hague rule because they will 
be protected by virtue of Minnesota residence, Minnesota delivery of 
the insurance policy, or Minnesota locus of the accident. It cannot, 
therefore, be taken for granted that there is an impact on the work 
force in general. 125 Unwillingness to require empirical support is apt 
if the state has an actual domestic regulatory scheme because the 
Court should be reluctant to second guess a bona fide regulatory 
judgment. But where the state has no general domestic policy of reg-
ulating employment through insurance stacking, the Court would 
not be second guessing a state's decision about a domestic issue ad-
mittedly within the state's lawmaking competence. It would merely 
be concluding, rather reasonably, that a state must show something 
other than a naked inclination to apply forum law on any pretext. 
In theory, an effects test is inadequate because it imposes virtu-
ally no limits at all. As Hague illustrates, it is almost always possible 
to hypothesize in-state consequences. Insurance stacking just as 
"surely affects" Minnesota interests in cases where the plaintiff's law-
yer is licensed in Minnesota and is working for a contingent fee. Or 
in Hague, the plurality could have cited the Minnesota residence of 
the plaintiff's new husband as establishing an "effect." Since all con-
tacts seem equally sufficient to satisfy a test based on "actual effect," 
then the requirement that they be "significant contacts, creating in-
terests," is vacuous. The plurality may have accepted employment 
as a significant contact simply because it had no idea what it was 
looking for. 
CONCLUSION 
The requirement of a domestic regulatory connection developed 
in this Article both resembles and departs from the traditional gov-
ernmental interest methodology. One difference is that this ap-
proach recognizes a wider range of constitutionally significant 
contacts. Although Brainerd Currie sometimes argued that tradi-
tional connecting factors were irrelevant to evaluation of interests, 126 
125. If an impact on the work force in general is not required, and impact on a specific 
member of the work force is enough, then the argument merely restates the conclusion: 
Hague's employment status is significant because stacking affects a member of the Minnesota 
work force. 
126. See B. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 116 (residence of parties important in married wo-
men's contracting cases, but not place of contracting). See generally id. at 77-127 (explaining 
the situations in which states have interests in such cases). Currie also argued that application 
of Arizona law in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), on the "place of 
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the restrictive aspects of his constitutional theory are inherently im-
plausible and find no support in the cases.127 More importantly, this 
Article goes beyond the existing governmental interest literature. 
Although interest analysts have used state policies to define interests, 
they never came to grips with the theoretical difficulties that such 
reliance creates. Uncritical deference to a state's multistate policies, 
whether explicitly stated or disguised as domestic justifications, 
emasculates constitutional standards. 
The similarities, however, are striking. Both approaches reject a 
mechanical search for contacts possessing talismanic significance, 128 
and emphasize instead the litigation context in which the issues arise. 
In particular, both recognize that courts must assess a contact's con-
stitutional value in light of the underlying policies of the rule to be 
applied. Furthermore, although interest analysts have not noticed 
the problems in defining the role of state and federal law, they might 
agree with this Article's proposed solution once the question is 
squarely posed. Thus Part I's rejection of conflict-of-law policies 
may be implicit in what Currie had in mind all along. 129 And Part 
Il's requirement that a state's domestic policies have objective sup-
port serves some of the same purposes as the recent insistence that 
legitimate interests be "real" rather than speculative.130 
The theory of legitimate interests presented here addresses only a 
small subset of constitutional choice-of-law issues. It is sometimes 
wrong" theory would be a denial of due process. B. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 162-63; id. at 
583 (when Court finally becomes enlightened, it will hold that traditional rules violate the 
equal protection clause). 
127. Hague itself seemed to proceed on the assumption that traditional rules supplied ade-
quate constitutional basis for application of forum law. It cited a number of older cases that 
had used the "place of wrong" and "place of making" tests. 101 S. Ct. at 638 n.11 (plurality 
opinion). 
One other indication that interest analysis is more restrictive than the constitutional test 
can be found in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). A lower federal 
court sitting in diversity had declined to follow the state's First Restatement approach on the 
theory that on the facts the place of wrong had "no interest." The Supreme Court reversed, 
citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). If the constitutional "inter-
est" test were the same as Currie's, the lower court would have been right, albeit for the wrong 
reason . .Day & Zimmermann did not address the constitutional question. Yet the failure to 
raise or discuss the question suggests that the parties and the Court saw no constitutional 
problems in a state using the "place of wrong" rule. Certainly, if interest analysis were a 
constitutional requirement, the case was wrongly resolved. 
128. It should be noted that even the First Restatement did not make one factor talismanic 
for all issues. It used different contacts for contract, tort, and procedural issues, for instance. 
129. See note 59 supra. 
130. See Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach lo Choice of Law: An Analysis and a 
Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181,221 (1977) (asking whether there is a "real" interest as 
opposed to a hypothetical or a possible interest). The test Professor Sedler urges is, however, 
quite different from mine. See also B. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 277 (Supreme Court may ask 
whether policy has any demonstrable existence). 
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maintained that a state can constitutionally apply its law whenever it 
has a legitimate interest. 131 My argument that a legitimate interest 
gives a state a prima facie claim to apply its law is less ambitious, 
leaving open the possibility that one state's interests may constitu-
tionally outweigh another's. 132 Additionally, even if a state has no 
legitimate interest, it may still be necessary to ascertain that an alter-
native jurisdiction's rule would be constitutionally preferable.133 Fi-
nally, this Article's definition of legitimate interests primarily 
considers limitations based upon state sovereignty. Other constitu-
tional limits are created by due process fairness concerns, 134 and by 
the equal protection 135 and privileges and immunities136 clauses. 
Despite its admitted limitations, this theory of legitimate interests 
is a needed first step. Unfortunately, the Hague plurality failed to 
provide standards for determining when contacts are significant and 
interests legitimate. Unless "legitimate interests" is either to remain 
a purely question-begging formulation of the constitutional conclu-
sion, or else to disintegrate into a carte blanche for the states to do 
exactly as they pleas(?, some judicial clarification is in order. 
131. B. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 189. 
132. Application of the law of an alternative jurisdiction may not violate state sovereignty 
but it may run afoul of other constitutional values. See notes 134-36 infra. In this situation 
the Court faces a difficult balancing question because, no matter which jurisdiction is allowed 
to apply its law, at least one constitutional concern will suffer. This problem will be the subject 
of a future article. 
133. Compare Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 110 (discussing "reciprocal contacts"), with 
Currie's position, illustrated in note 59 supra, that such a constitutional determination is un-
necessary. 
134. The cases have sought to protect the litigants from unfair surprise. See Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. at 648 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, it must be asked whether 
the in-state contacts can be fairly attributed to the adverse party. Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 39, 
at 91 (discussing the analogous problems of causation and foreseeability in the adjudicative 
jurisdiction context). 
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. See note 64supra. 
136. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl 1. See note 64 supra. 
